- Establish contribution before deciding the size of the center.
- Assess benefits alongside the effort required within the businesses.
- Require evidence that complementary businesses create a shared advantage.
Before approving the next headquarters budget, a group CFO should ask what the businesses gain from that expenditure. A smaller center may be the right answer. But cutting central costs while transferring work to subsidiaries proves little about group efficiency.
Contribution has to be settled before size. A reduction in central cost is not an efficiency gain if the work, the risk or the delay has simply moved into the businesses.
The starting point is therefore the contribution the businesses need rather than the structure of headquarters itself.
Dubai’s Government Shared Procurement Programme, Tasharok, separates central support from specialist delivery. The Dubai Department of Finance’s Support Services Centre supports participating entities, while seven specialized entities lead procurement and establish framework agreements. By design, participating entities keep their operational independence.
In December 2025, the Department reported AED313.5 million in cumulative savings across 72 government entities, covering September 2020 to August 2025. It also reported average procurement time falling from 14 days to four. These are program-reported results, not a corporate savings benchmark.
The design offers a useful distinction for group leaders: decide what should be shared, then determine where the expertise and authority should sit.
The claim that cutting central cost proves little if the work moves into the businesses is one of three related failures. Naming all three gives a review something specific to test.
A first review should test all three explicitly, because each is invisible to a different measure. Duplication hides from cost comparison. Displacement hides from the management charge. Delay hides from both.

For state-owned groups, the stewardship distinction draws on the OECD’s separation of ownership expectations from operational autonomy.
A mandatory responsibility still deserves scrutiny of how it is delivered. Retaining an essential control should not exempt duplicate reporting or unnecessary approvals from examination. Nor should stewardship be forced into an artificial financial return.
The question a board actually faces is not whether the center contributes. It is which contribution requires ownership at group level, which needs only coordination, and which could be obtained more cheaply elsewhere. Three claims, with three different standards of proof.
A portfolio of unrelated businesses may legitimately have no parenting claim at all, and be better served by disciplined capital allocation and operational independence. Collaboration has to earn its place too.
Most decisions to centralize were sound when taken. The problem is that they are almost never revisited, and the conditions that justified them expire.
A capability was centralized because no business had the expertise. Three years later, two do. A control was retained at the center because the systems could not support local visibility. The systems now can. A service was consolidated for scale that the group has since sold.
So a center’s claim should carry a review date in the same way a capital decision does. The question at review is not whether the center is performing well, which it may be. It is whether the reason for central ownership still holds. A group that can answer that for each central activity has a different relationship with its own structure than one that inherits it.
The review may justify more investment at the center. It may reveal that a business already holds the expertise the group needs. The outcome should follow the evidence, including what the businesses can credibly deliver independently.
A group CFO should be able to explain the protection, service and advantage the management charge supports.
Every business can read its management charge. A center earns its place when it can show what that charge bought.